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Abstract. Bounding the inefficiency of selfish routing has become an emerging research 
subject. A central result obtained in the literature is that the inefficiency of deterministic User 
Equilibrium (UE) is bounded and the bound is independent of network topology. This paper 
makes a contribution to the literature by bounding the inefficiency of the logit-based 
Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE). In a stochastic environment there are two different 
definitions of system optimization: one is the traditional System Optimum (SO) which 
minimizes the total actual system travel time, and the other is the Stochastic System 
Optimum (SSO) which minimizes the total perceived travel time of all users. Thus there are 
two ways to define the inefficiency of SUE, i.e. to compare SUE with SO in terms of total 
actual system travel time, or to compare SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time. 
We establish upper bounds on the inefficiency of SUE in both situations. 
 
Keywords: Transportation; Selfish routing; Inefficiency; Stochastic user equilibrium 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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A common behavioral assumption in traffic network modeling is that every user chooses a 
route that she perceives as being the shortest under the prevailing traffic conditions. In other 
words, every traveler tries to minimize her own (perceived) travel time. This selfish routing 
assumption leads to the deterministic user equilibrium (UE) traffic assignment when users are 
assumed to have perfect information, or their perceived travel times are exactly their actual 
ones. More realistically, the perceived travel time may be considered as a random variable 
distributed across the population of users, i.e. each user may perceive a different travel time 
over the same link. Then the selfish routing assumption results in the stochastic user 
equilibrium (SUE) traffic assignment (Sheffi, 1985). In contrast to uncoordinated selfish 
travel behaviors, system optimization is to minimize the total system travel time which 
measures the overall network performance under fixed demand. A system optimum (SO) flow 
pattern has the maximum efficiency by definition. Not surprisingly, selfish routing generally 
does not yield an SO flow pattern, which implies that UE and SUE are typically inefficient. 
 
There has been an increasing interest recently in trying to quantify and bound the inefficiency 
of Nash equilibrium or UE in transportation context. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) 
proposed to analyze the inefficiency of equilibria from a worst-case perspective. The term 
“price of anarchy” was coined to characterize the degree of inefficiency (Papadimitriou, 
2001), which is the ratio of the worst social cost of a Nash Equilibrium to the cost of an 
optimal solution. Roughgarden (2003) proved that the worst-case inefficiency due to selfish 
routing is independent of the network topology. Several authors analyzed the bound on the 
inefficiency of equilibria for more general classes of cost functions and model features such 
as toll pricing (e.g. Chau and Sim, 2003; Correa et al, 2004; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2004; 
Han et al., 2008; Han and Yang, 2008; Yang et al., 2008). Roughgarden (2005) summarized 
the latest developments of this research subject. Nevertheless, in the context of traffic 
networks, the various studies up to date focused on the case of deterministic UE, the 
inefficiency of SUE was, however, ignored so far. 
 
This study is intended to make a contribution to the above emerging literature by determining 
the worst-case inefficiency of the logit-based SUE. The logit SUE model is an important one 
in transportation science that addresses suboptimal user route choices or difference in the 
costs perceived by different users. Before discussing the inefficiency of SUE, we should 
mention that there are two different system optimum definitions in a stochastic environment: 
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one is the aforementioned conventional SO which minimizes the total actual system travel 
time, and the other is the stochastic system optimum (SSO) which minimizes the total 
perceived travel time of all users (Maher et al., 2005; Stewart, 2007), or equivalently 
maximizes the net economic benefit (Yang, 1999). As a result, there are two ways to define 
the inefficiency of SUE, i.e. to compare SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel 
time, or to compare SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time (or equivalently in 
term of network economic benefit). We study the inefficiency of SUE in both situations. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. For completeness, Section 2 gives a brief 
review of bounding the inefficiency of deterministic UE. In Sections 3 and 4, we make use of 
the equivalent variational inequality (VI) formulation of the logit-based SUE, and compare 
SUE with SO and SSO, respectively, to bound its inefficiency with the two alternative 
definitions of total system travel time. In Section 5, we discuss the tightness of the 
inefficiency bounds established. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Review of bounding the inefficiency of deterministic UE 
 
We consider a transportation network described as a strongly connected, directed network 
 ,N A  where N  and A  denote the sets of nodes and links, respectively. Let W  denote 
the set of all Origin-Destination (OD) pairs, wR  be the set of all paths between OD pair 
w W , wd  be the travel demand between OD pair w W , rwf  be the flow on path 
wr R , w W , and av  be the flow on link a A . The following relationships and 
constraints hold 
 
w
a rw ar
w W r R
v f
 
   , a A   (1) 
 
w
w rw
r R
d f

  , w W   (2) 
 0rwf  , wr R , w W   (3) 
where ar  is equal to 1 if path r  uses link a  and 0 otherwise. Let link flow vector be 
 Τ,av a A v  and path flow vector be  Τ, ,rw wf r R w W  f , then the feasible set of 
link flows is given by   there exists an  such that (1)-(3) holdv  v f , and the feasible set 
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of path flows is given by  constraints (2)-(3) holdf  f . In this paper, we consider 
separable link cost (travel time) function  a at v , a A , which means that the travel time of 
one link depends on the flow on the link only. It is assumed that  a at v  is a nondecreasing 
function of av  for all a A . Let rwc  be the travel time along path wr R , w W , which 
is the sum of travel times on all links that constitute the path. We thus have 
  rw a a ar
a A
c t v

  , wr R , w W   (4) 
The total system travel time  T v  is given by 
    
w
a a a rw rw
a A w W r R
T t v v c f
  
   v   (5) 
 
It is well known (e.g., Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980) that the UE problem can be formulated 
as an equivalent VI problem, namely to find ue vv  such that 
   ue ue 0a a a a
a A
t v v v

  , for any vv  (6) 
With the UE link flow solution ue ,v  the total system travel time under UE is given by 
   ue ue ueUE a a aa AT T t v v v . On the other hand, the SO problem that minimizes the total 
system travel time is given by 
  min  
v
a a a
a A
t v v 
v   (7) 
Let sov  denote the link flow solution to the SO problem, then the minimum system travel 
time is given by    so so soSO a a aa AT T t v v v . Define the following ratio 
 
 
 
ue
ue UE
so
SO
TT
T T
   v
v
  (8) 
Clearly, it holds that ue 1  . This ratio is called the inefficiency, or price of anarchy, of the 
selfish user equilibria (Papadimitriou, 2001). 
 
The way to bound the inefficiency of UE is also used later when we analyze the SUE case. 
Therefore, for completeness, a brief outline of bounding ue  is given here, based on the 
geometric proof due to Correa et al (2005). 
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The bounding method is based on the VI formulation (6). Let vv  be an arbitrary 
feasible link flow, then from VI (6) it follows 
           ue ue ue uea a a a a a a a a a a a a a
a A a A a A a A
t v v t v v t v v t v t v v
   
        (9) 
 
We now consider how to upper bound the last term of the right-hand side of (9) in terms of 
the left-hand side of (9). Note that each link cost function is nondecreasing and thus 
    ue 0a a a a at v t v v   for ue ,a av v  we only need to focus on the term     uea a a a at v t v v  
for which uea av v . In this case,     uea a a a at v t v v  is equal to the area of the shaded 
rectangle in Figure 1, and  ue uea a at v v  is the area of the large rectangle in Figure 1. 
 
 
Flow
Travel Time
0
Free-flow
Travel Time
av
 a at v
 uea at v
Link Cost
Function
ue
av
0
at
 
Figure 1. Geometric illustration of the definition of     
 
We need to upper bound the area of the shaded rectangle in terms of the area of the large 
rectangle. To do this, for each link cost function  at   and nonnegative link flow 0,az   
we define the following parameter 
        0, maxa a a a a aa a a v a a a
t z t v v
t z
t z z
  , a A  (10) 
Here, 0 0 0  by convention. Since       a a a a a a a at z t v v t z v   if 0 a av z   and 
     0a a a a at z t v v   if ,a av z  we have   0 , 1.a a at z    For a given class   of 
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link cost functions (e.g., polynomials of a certain degree), we let 
    
, 0
max ,
a a
a a at z
t z
 
  

     (11) 
With this definition, we have the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1.  Let uev  be the UE link flow with separable link cost functions drawn from a 
given class ,  and let v  be an arbitrary nonnegative link flow. Then 
         ue uea a a a a
a A
t v t v v T

   v   (12) 
 
Proof.  From definitions (10) and (11), with az  replaced by 
ue
av , we have 
 
        
       
ue ue ue ue
ue ue ue
,
                                     
a a a a a a a a a a a
a A a A
a a a
a A
t v t v v t v t v v
t v v T
 

  
   
 
 v   
which completes the proof. ♦ 
 
With Lemma 1, substituting (12) into (9) gives rise to 
        ue ueT T T  v v v , for any vv  (13) 
Let sov v  in (13), we have the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1.  Let uev  be the UE link flow with separable link cost functions drawn from a 
given class  , and sov  be an SO link flow, then 
 
 
   
ue
ue
so
1
1
T
T
    
v
v    (14) 
 
Theorem 1 simply states that the upper bound,    11     on the inefficiency, ue , of UE, 
or the worst-case inefficiency of UE is independent of the network topology but dependent on 
the class of cost functions only. 
 
 
3. Bounding the inefficiency of SUE compared with SO 
 
 7 
We now consider the case of stochastic user equilibrium. In a SUE model, each user is a 
utility-maximizer, and each path, r , wr R , w W , is an alternative associated with some 
random utility function rwU . A given path’s utility is primarily related to its travel time, then 
rwU  is given by 
 rw rw rw rwU C c      , wr R , w W  (15) 
where rwC  is the random perceived travel time along the path,   is a positive unit scaling 
parameter, rwc  is the actual travel time along the path as defined before, rwc  is the 
measured utility, and rw  is a random term associated with the path under consideration and 
can be considered to represent the unobservable or unmeasurable factors of utility. Let rwP  
denote the probability of users choosing path r , wr R , w W , which is also the share of 
users choosing the path, then the utility maximization (perceived travel time minimization) 
principle implies that 
  Pr ,  rw rw kw wP U U k R    , wr R , w W  (16) 
This choice probability has the following properties 
 0 1rwP  , wr R  and 1
w
rw
r R
P

 , w W  
 
If the random term rw  in (15) is assumed to be normally distributed, one would obtain the 
probit-based route choice model. However, the probit-based model does not entail a 
closed-form expression of the path choice probability and thus makes our subsequent analysis 
of inefficiency analytically intractable. Hence we consider the logit-based route choice model 
only. The logit-based model assumes that the random terms of the utility functions associated 
with all paths are independently and identically distributed Gumbel random variables. The 
choice probability is then given by 
   
exp
exp
w
rw
rw
kw
k R
c
P
c

  , wr R , w W  (17) 
and the path flow assignment is given by 
 rw w rwf d P , wr R , w W   (18) 
 
It is well-known (Fisk, 1980) that the above logit-based SUE model can be formulated as the 
following equivalent minimization problem 
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  
0
1min  ( )d ln
a
f
w
v
a rw rw
a A w W r R
Z t f f   
    f f  (19) 
 
Denote SUE path flow as sue ff , and the corresponding SUE link flow sue vv , the 
total system travel time under SUE is given by    sue sue sue sueSUE
w
rw rw a a a
w W r R a A
T c f t v v
  
   f . 
Similar to that of UE, the inefficiency of SUE compared with SO is defined as 
 sue SUE
SO
T
T
    (20) 
To find an upper bound on the inefficiency of SUE (compared with SO here or compared 
with SSO later), we need the equivalent VI formulation for the logit-based SUE model, which 
is given in the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2.  If the separable link cost function,   ,  ,a at v a A  is monotonically increasing 
with link flow, a logit-based SUE problem with fixed OD demand is equivalent to the 
following variational inequality, i.e., find sue ff , such that 
    sue sue sue1 ln 0
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f f f
 
       f , for any ff  (21) 
 
Proof.  It suffices to prove that minimization problem (19) is equivalent to VI (21). With the 
assumption of monotonically increasing link cost function, problem (19) of minimizing a 
strictly convex function over a compact (closed and bounded) set guarantees the existence 
and uniqueness of a path flow solution sue ff . In addition, the entropy-type objective 
function ensures that the optimum is achieved at an interior point. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for sue ff  to be the unique optimal solution to problem (19) is that 
    Tsue sue 0Z    f f f f , for any ff  (22) 
Using ,
w
a rw arw W r R
v f     substituting 
      Tsue sue sue sue sue1 1 1 1, + ln + , , + ln + ,rw a a ar rw rw
a A
Z f t v f c

                  f f f     
into (22), and in view of    sue1 1 0
w
rw rw w w
w W r R w W
f f d d
  
      , we have VI (21). This 
completes the proof.     ♦ 
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With the equivalent VI formulation of the logit-based SUE given in Lemma 2, we can move 
on to bound the inefficiency of SUE. Let so ff  be a system-optimal path flow, and let 
sof f  in VI (21), we have 
    sue sue so sue1 ln 0
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f f f
 
       f   (23) 
Denote  sue suerw rwc c f  and  so sorw rwc c f , (23) gives 
  sue sue sue so so sue sue1 ln
w w w
rw rw rw rw rw rw rw
w W r R w W r R w W r R
c f c f f f f
     
         
which is equivalent to 
    sue so so so sue sueSUE SO 1 ln
w w
rw rw rw rw rw rw
w W r R w W r R
T T c c f f f f
   
         (24) 
In view of 
       sue so so sue so so
w
rw rw rw a a a a a
w W r R a A
c c f t v t v v
  
      
we can rewrite (24) as 
      sue so so so sue sueSUE SO 1 ln
w
a a a a a rw rw rw
a A w W r R
T T t v t v v f f f
  
        (25) 
 
With parameters  ,a a at z , a A  and     defined by (10) and (11), respectively, we 
have similar result as in Lemma 1 
       sue SUEa a a a a
a A
t v t v v T

    , for any 0v  (26) 
Let sov v  in (26), then we obtain 
      sue so so SUEa a a a a
a A
t v t v v T

      (27) 
 
With (27), we have an upper bound on the second term of the right-hand side of (25) in terms 
of SUET . Now we seek an upper bound on the third term. 
 
Lemma 3.  Consider the following maximization problem 
   
1
max  , = ln
n
i i i
i
Z y x x

x y   (28) 
subject to 
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1
n
i
i
x d

  (29) 
1
n
i
i
y d

  (30) 
 , 0,  1,2, ,i ix y i n    (31) 
where 0d   is a constant. The optimal value of this problem is max ,Z kd  where k  
solves equation 1 1kke n   , with e  being the base of natural logarithm. 
 
Proof:  Note that the objective function (28) is linear in y , and in view of the constraints 
on y , it is not difficult to see that the optimal vector y  has one component equal to d  and 
the others equal to 0 (if the optimal vector y  is not unique, there exists such an optimal 
corner solution). Without loss of generality, let  T,0,...,0dy  be an optimal y  vector, 
then the objective function (28) is simplified to be 
   1 1
2
max  = ln ln
n
i i
i
Z d x x x x

 x   (32) 
and the KKT necessary conditions for the optimality of x  are 
   0
i
Z
x
   
x
, 0,ix     0,i
i
Z
x
x
     
x
 1, 2,...i n  
where   is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the equality constraint (29). In view of 
  1 1 1ln 1Z x x d x     x  and   ln 1i iZ x x    x , 2,...i n , the optimal solution 
must have 0,  1, 2, , ,ix i n    because 0ix   would give   iZ x   x , which 
obviously violates the optimality condition. Then the KKT conditions reduce to 
1
1
ln 1 0dx
x
      , 1 0x    (33) 
ln 1 0ix     , 0ix  , 2, ,i n    (34) 
Combining (33) and (34), we have 
1
1 2
ln xd
x x
   (35) 
2ix x , 3, ,i n    (36) 
Substituting (35) into objective function (32), we have the optimal objective value 
   max 1 1 2 2ln 1 lnZ d x x n x x      (37) 
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In view of   2 11n x d x   , and making use of (35), we obtain 
max
1
1dZ d
x
    
  (38) 
Let 1 1k d x  , then we have maxZ kd , and 
1
1
1
x d
k
  ,   2 1 1
kx d
n k
     (39) 
Substituting (39) into (35) gives that k  solves 1 1kke n   . This completes the proof.    ♦ 
 
From Lemma 3, it follows immediately that 
 so sue sueln ,  
w
rw rw rw w w
r R
f f f k d w W

    (40) 
where wk  solves 
1 1wkw wk e R
    and wR  is the number of feasible paths between OD 
pair .w W  Substituting (27) and (40) into (25) yields 
  SUE SO SUE 1T T T kD      (41) 
where ww WD d  is the total traffic demand and k  is the average of ,  wk w W  
weighted by OD demand: 
 ,w w
w W
dk k
D
     where wk  solves 1 1wkw wk e R      (42) 
 
If we define SOc T D  as the average travel time of all network users at system optimum, 
then (41) can be rewritten as 
  SUE SO SUE SO1T T T kTc      
which gives rise to 
  SUE SO
1 11
1
T k T
c
          
 (43) 
 
The term 1 c  in (43) needs to be further addressed. The logit model parameter ,  in its 
original meaning, is inversely proportional to the standard error of the distribution of the 
perceived path travel times (Sheffi, 1985), and the logit model assumes that all paths in the 
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network has the same standard error. Specifically,  6    , where   is the common 
standard deviation of the perceived path travel times. Then we have 
 1 6
c c
    (44) 
To provide more sensible results, we define 0c  as the average free-flow travel time for all 
OD pairs, then it is clear that 0c c . Furthermore, we define a ratio 0c   . Then 
replacing c  with 0c  in (44) yields 
 
0
1 6 6
c c
       (45) 
where 0c    measures the standard deviation of perceived travel time as percentage of 
the average free-flow travel time. Intuitively, the ratio 0c    is like a coefficient of 
variance, which represents the relative travel time perception error of users. Considering that 
in reality, users’ absolute perception error   may increase as the path travel time increases, 
the relative error   may better reflect users’ perception randomness. 
 
Substituting (45) into (43), we have the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2 Let SUET  be the total system travel time under logit-based stochastic user 
equilibrium, and SOT  be the minimum total system travel time, then 
  sue SUESO
1 61
1
T k
T
            
 (46) 
 
Comparing (46) with (14), we find that the bound of sue  is generally larger than the bound 
of ue , which means that the worst-case inefficiency of SUE is generally worse than that of 
UE. Note that this comparison is made in the respect of the worst-case inefficiency, a specific 
SUE can be more efficient than UE on a network. 
 
The bounding result given by (46) depends on three dimensionless parameters, namely    , 
k  and  . As mentioned for the deterministic UE case,     is defined exclusively by the 
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class of link cost functions, k  (or more essentially, wk ) is determined by the number of 
available paths and thus reflects the degree of network complexity, and   represents the 
relative travel time perception error of users. If users’ perception error is zero or the travel 
time is deterministic, then 0   and (46) becomes    1sue 1      , thus we have the 
inefficiency bound of the standard deterministic UE. In addition, if 1wR   for all ,w W  
i.e. each OD pair has only one feasible path and hence travel time perception error has no 
effect on route choice, we have 0,  wk w W   from (42) and thus 0k  . In this case, we 
have    1sue 1       as well. 
 
Whenever 1wR  , the value of wk  (and hence k ) is very limited. As seen in Table 1, wk  
is only marginally larger than 10log wR . For a sufficiently complex network with the number 
of paths between each OD pair being 100 1000wR  , wk  takes only a limited value 
between 2.63 and 4.42. This observation shows that the network size has very limited effect 
on the cost inefficiency bound of stochastic user equilibrium. 
 
Table 1. Numerical values of wk  with increasing wR  
wR  1 10 210  310  410  
wk  0 1.10 2.63 4.42 6.36 
 
 
4. Bounding the inefficiency of SUE compared with SSO 
 
In a stochastic traffic assignment environment, besides the total actual system travel time, the 
total perceived travel time of all users is also a useful system performance index, as it reflects 
the net economic benefit. For the logit-based stochastic traffic assignment model, the total 
perceived travel time of all users can be given in a closed-form expression as (Maher et al. 
2005) 
     1 1ln ln
w
a a a rw rw w w
a A w W r R w W
F t v v f f d d
   
      f  (47) 
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and its opposite,  F f , can be regarded as the net economic benefit (the direct utility 
corresponding to the aggregate demand minus the total travel time incurred by all users in the 
network) (Yang, 1999). The stochastic system optimization (SSO) problem is to minimize the 
total perceived travel time (or equivalently, to maximize the net economic benefit), namely 
  min  
f
Ff f   (48) 
Let sso ff  solve the SSO problem (48), then  ssoSSOF F f  is the minimum total 
perceived travel time of all users, and correspondingly, SSOF  is the maximum net economic 
benefit (or consumer surplus) of the network. Specifically, 
  sso sso sso ssoSSO 1 1ln ln
w
a a a rw rw w w
a A w W r R w W
F t v v f f d d
   
        (49) 
 
On the other hand, uncoordinated selfish travel behaviors of users will result in an SUE flow 
pattern sue ff , with  sueSUEF F f  being the total perceived travel time of all users at 
equilibrium. Specifically 
  sue sue sue sueSUE 1 1ln ln
w
a a a rw rw w w
a A w W r R w W
F t v v f f d d
   
        (50) 
 
By definition, we have SUE SSOF F . However, unlike the previous cases, in which we use the 
ratios UE SO 1T T   and SUE SO 1T T   to measure the inefficiency of UE and SUE compared 
with SO, here we can not use the ratio SUE SSOF F  to measure the inefficiency of SUE 
compared with SSO. The reason is that SUEF  and SSOF  may be negative as can be seen 
from (49)-(50), which means that the ratio SUE SSOF F  may be meaningless (consider the 
case SUE SSO0F F  ). Consequently, instead of using the ratio of SUEF  to SSOF , we shall 
use the difference between SUEF  and SSOF , namely the term SUE SSO 0F F  , which is the 
absolute efficiency loss of SUE compared with SSO. We can have a clearer understanding of 
the term  SUE SSOF F  from an economic viewpoint: since  SSOF  and  SUEF  are, 
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respectively, the maximum possible net economic benefit and the net economic benefit 
realized at equilibrium, the difference between the two, equal to  SUE SSOF F , naturally 
represents the welfare loss caused by uncoordinated selfish routing behaviors of users. 
 
To bound the inefficiency of SUE compared with SSO, we shall give an upper bound on the 
welfare loss  SUE SSOF F  in terms of some meaningful measure. To this end, we make use 
of the equivalent VI formulation of the logit-based SUE. The manipulation is quite similar to 
that in last section. Specifically, let ssof f  in VI (21), we have 
    sue sue sso sue1 ln 0
w
rw rw rw rw
w W r R
c f f f
 
       f   (51) 
Denote  sue suerw rwc c f  and  sso ssorw rwc c f , (51) gives 
 sue sue sue sue sue sso sso sue1 1ln ln
w w w w
rw rw rw rw rw rw rw rw
w W r R w W r R w W r R w W r R
c f f f c f f f
       
            
which is equivalent to 
    sue sso sso sso sue ssoSUE SSO 1 ln ln
w w
rw rw rw rw rw rw
w W r R w W r R
F F c c f f f f
   
         (52) 
In view of 
       sue sso sso sue sso sso
w
rw rw rw a a a a a
w W r R a A
c c f t v t v v
  
      
we can rewrite (52) as 
      sue sso sso sso sue ssoSUE SSO 1 ln ln
w
a a a a a rw rw rw
a A w W r R
F F t v t v v f f f
  
        (53) 
 
Now we only need to provide upper bounds on the two terms of the right-hand side of (53). 
For the first term, its upper bound can be obtained in the same way as we obtain (27) in last 
section. Specifically, let ssov v  in (26), we simply have 
      sue sso sso SUEa a a a a
a A
t v t v v T

      (54) 
From Gibbs’ inequality (or the property of the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two 
discrete probability distributions), we readily have a zero upper bound of the second term of 
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the right-hand side of (53). Namely, the following inequality holds 
 sso sue ssoln ln 0,  
w
rw rw rw
r R
f f f w W

    (55) 
with equality if and only if sue sso ,  ,  rw rw wf f r R w W   . Substituting (54) and (55) into (53) 
gives the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 3 For a logit-based stochastic traffic assignment model, let SUET  and SUEF  be, 
respectively, the total actual system travel time and the total perceived travel time of all users 
under stochastic user equilibrium, and let SSOF  be the minimum possible total perceived 
travel time of all users, then 
 SUE SSO
SUE
F F
T
      (56) 
 
Theorem 3 states that the welfare loss, SUE SSOF F , of SUE compared with SSO is not larger 
than a fraction of the total actual system travel time, SUET , under SUE. Like the deterministic 
UE case, the fraction or     is independent of network topology, but depends solely on the 
class of link cost functions. 
 
 
5. On the tightness of the inefficiency bounds 
 
We begin with our discussion of the tightness of the inefficiency bounds by presenting all the 
results in Theorems 1-3 into the following similar expressions for a comparison. 
 
Theorem 1: bounding the efficiency loss of deterministic UE 
 UE SO
UE
T T
T
      (57) 
Theorem 2: bounding the efficiency loss of SUE compared with SO 
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 SUE SO
SUE
6
1 6
kT T
T k
       

  (58) 
Theorem 3: bounding the welfare loss of SUE compared with SSO 
 SUE SSO
SUE
F F
T
      (59) 
All the three major results involve the common parameter,    , that depends on the given 
class,  , of link cost functions under consideration. Specific expression of     can be 
obtained for the following practical class of link cost functions: 
   0 ,  pa a a a at v t v a A      (60) 
where 0at  is a constant free-flow travel time, 0a   is a link-specific non-negative 
parameter, and 0p   reflects the degree of congestion sensitivity of the link costs. In this 
case one can easily obtain (Roughgarden, 2005) 
 
1
1
1 1
pp
p p
            (61) 
with   0   as 0p   (without traffic congestion), and   1   as p   (with 
severe congestion). For the widely used BPR type link cost function with 4,p   we have 
  0.5350  . 
 
The bound in (57) for the deterministic UE is tight and can be furnished by a simple example 
with one OD pair connected by two parallel links (Roughgarden, 2003). Let the link travel 
time functions be  1 1 1t v   and    2 2 2 ,  0pt v v p  , and let the OD demand be 
1 2 1.d v v    The UE solution is ue1 0v   and ue2 1v   with UE 1.T   The SO solution is 
  1so1 1 1 pv p     and   1so2 1 pv p    with   ( 1)SO 1 1 1.p pT p p       Therefore, 
 UE SO UET T T =   ( 1)1 p pp p   , which is consistent with     given in (61).   
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The bound in (58) for SUE is somewhat complicated, because the system inefficiency under 
SUE is due to the combined effects of congestion externality and users’ perception 
randomness, which, in general, cannot be decoupled. This also renders that it is generally 
difficult to find a specific instance to furnish the established upper bound in a general 
congested network, which requires inequality (27) and (40) to take equality simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, we can shed some light on the tightness of the inefficiency bound by 
considering certain special cases. First, when users’ perception error is zero (   or 
0 0c    , as mentioned earlier), SUE reduces to the deterministic UE and the bound (58) 
reduces to (57), and hence it is tight. Second, in a network without congestion or when link 
costs are all constants, the system inefficiency due to congestion externality becomes 
immaterial and the system efficiency loss is solely due to users’ perception randomness. In 
this case we have   0   and the bound in (58) reduces to 
 SUE SO
61 kT T
    
 (62) 
 
One can easily construct a simple example for which equality holds for (62). Consider a 
network having one OD pair connected by 10 parallel links as shown in Figure 2. In this case 
k  solves for 1 1kke n    with 10n   (or 1.101k  ). Suppose 0 0.5c     in the 
logit-based route choice model, where 0c , by definition, is the (minimum) free-flow OD 
travel time between the single OD pair. Without loss of generality, we can simply let link 1 
has the shortest constant travel time and let 1 1.0t  . Thus, 0 0.5c     and the logit 
model parameter  6 2.565     . Recall the proof of Lemma 3, to make (62) an 
equality it suffices to construct an appropriate constant travel time 2 3 10 1.0t t t     
such that the resulting SUE link flow equal to the optimal solution given by (39), i.e. 
 1 1v d k   and    2 3 10 1 1v v v d k n k      . Let the OD demand be 1d  , we 
have 1 0.4760v   and 2 3 10... 0.0582v v v    . Indeed this SUE link flow pattern can be 
generated by choosing 2 3 10 1.819t t t     with 2.565   in the logit model. The 
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corresponding SUE 1 1 2 29 1.429T v t v t   . In view of SO 1 1.0T t d   , we have 
SUE SO1.429T T . This exactly attains the equality in (62), which, in this specific example, is 
 SUE SO SO1 6 1.101 0.5 1.429T T T      . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A network such that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight 
 
We now move on to examine the tightness of the bound given in (59), which compares SUE 
with SSO in terms of total perceived system travel time. We give the following corollary 
based on Theorem 3. 
 
Corollary 1.   SUE SSO SUEF F T     if and only if   0  . 
 
Proof: First if   0  , then Theorem 3 gives SUE SSO 0F F  . Note that we always have 
SUE SSOF F  by the definition of SSO. Thus we have SUE SSOF F , which simply gives 
 SUE SSO SUEF F T     in view of   0  . On the other hand, suppose that 
 SUE SSO SUEF F T     holds. From the derivation of Theorem 3,  SUE SSO SUEF F T     
means that inequality (55) takes equality, and thus sue ssof f  and SUE SSOF F , which simply 
gives   0   from   SUE SSO SUEF F T    . This completes the proof.    ♦ 
 
Corollary 1 states that the bound in (59) is tight if and only if link costs are constants or 
  0  . In this case, sue ssof f  or the SUE is fully efficient in terms of minimizing total 
10 1.819t   
2 1.819t   
1 1t   
... 
 O  D 
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perceived system travel time. This can be also seen from the SUE objective function (19) and 
the SSO objective function (47): when link costs are constants, the two objective functions 
are equivalent (the third term of (47) is constant and thus can be omitted). For a general class 
of link cost functions (networks with congestion effects),   0  , the inefficiency bound 
(59) is not tight or we always have  SUE SSO SUEF F T    . Even so, this bounding result is 
still attractive in view of the property that     is independence of network topology. 
 
We conclude this section by offering a remark on the choice of the two social optimum 
concepts (SO and SSO) and the corresponding SUE inefficiency bounds given by (58) and 
(59). Clearly, choice of either one depends on the source (or the analyst’s interpretation) of 
users’ perception randomness. If users’ perception randomness is due to imprecise 
information about the actual travel times, then the inefficiency or deviation of SUE should be 
measured against the deterministic SO. If, however, users’ perception randomness is due to 
their different tastes or preferences for diversity in route choice, then SSO should be taken as 
the optimum criterion, because users’ variety-seeking behaviors are considered as a fraction 
of the net economic benefit. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have defined the inefficiency of SUE in two different ways, i.e. comparing SUE with SO 
in terms of total actual system travel time, or comparing SUE with SSO in terms of total 
perceived system travel time. For both notions, we provided upper bounds on the inefficiency 
of the logit-based SUE, based on its equivalent VI formulation and the properties of the 
divergence between two discrete path flow distributions.  
 
When comparing SUE with SO in terms of total actual system travel time, the inefficiency 
bound of SUE depends on both the class of cost functions and the degree of perception error 
and the network complexity. Nevertheless, it is found that the effect of network complexity in 
terms of number of available paths is rather limited. Unlike the price of anarchy of the 
deterministic UE established in the literature, the inefficiency bounds established for the SUE 
is generally not tight unless either the users’ perception error is zero or the network has 
constant link travel times. 
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When comparing SUE with SSO in terms of total perceived travel time (or equivalently net 
economic benefit), we established an upper bound on the welfare loss of SUE and found that 
the welfare loss is not larger than a fraction of the total actual system travel time under SUE, 
and the “fraction” is independent of network topology, but depends solely on the class of link 
cost functions. We also found that the established inefficiency bound is tight only when link 
costs are constants (in this case SUE coincides with SSO). 
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